My friend and host, Tucker, her son and I watched Source Code the other night. Starring Jake Gyllenhaal and Vera Farmiga, it's one of those thrillers with a sci-fi twist that manages not to be sci-fi. It's a fun watch, which is probably why nobody liked my constant philosophizing.
Spoilers follow (don't worry, you don't care).
So the premise of the movie is that a terrorist attack has destroyed a commuter train in Chicago, killing dozens of people. Authorities suspect that it is a precursor to a much larger attack, so they need to find out who's behind it.
Luckily, there's Source Code, a top-secret military project that is able to take the consciousness out of an almost-dead blown-up helicopter pilot (Gyllenhaal) and put it into the body of someone on the train, hours earlier. They can do it for eight minutes at a time, and the goal of each eight-minute mission is to find the identity of the bomber so they can catch him in the present.
But he's not a mere observer. He can get up, go places and find information that his host didn't know. He can even deactivate the bomb or get the pretty girl across from him off the train--though he's told that this doesn't actually change anything. If it does have an effect, it's on a different reality than his own. This would fall under the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics: every time he changes something in the past, a new universe is created in which those events occurred. If we assume this is the case, it's not a great leap to assume a new universe is created every time he goes back, since all he has to do is breathe in a slightly different pattern or say one word differently to create a new reality--even if it's practically identical to one that was already created.
We do eventually get confirmation that this is what is happening, because after he completes his mission and allows the people running him to capture the bomber, he insists on going back one last time to try what he has so far failed to do: save every person on the train. He knows it doesn't mean anything; he just wants to do it. At the end of this mission, Vera Farmiga agrees, his mutilated body will be taken off life support.
Naturally, Gyllenhaal rocks it. He disarms the bomb (both detonators this time), apprehends the bomber, and calls in the authorities. He also sends a quick e-mail and calls his father, who already thinks him dead, to speak with him one last time. He asks the pretty girl out, and at the end of the eight minutes, just as Farmiga is taking him off life support, kisses her passionately.
And then... he keeps kissing her. Apparently when his body finally dies in his reality, his consciousness doesn't snap back. He gets to remain in his new body with his new identity. He teaches everybody on the train a valuable lesson about enjoying life by paying a grumpy guy $100 to do a stand-up routine, then skips work and goes to Millennium Park.
Meanwhile, the Vera Farmiga of that reality is just starting her day when she gets an e-mail. It's from Gyllenhaal. "You should be seeing a story about a thwarted terrorist attack. You and I stopped it together, and Source Code works better than you ever imagined." See, while in his reality he only managed to stop the second attack, in this new reality, he stopped the first one, too. This is how we know it's the multiple universes thing and not just a meaningless eight-minute simulation.
Still with me?
There are some ethical concerns here. Firstly, what happened to the guy whose body he took over? Has his consciousness been permanently replaced by Gyllenhaal's?
But the real question I was left with was, is his use of time-travel ethical?
With the exception of the last instance, every time Gyllenhaal goes back, the train is destroyed. So every time he is creating another universe in which the terrorist attack--and the much larger second attack, which supposedly destroys downtown Chicago--occurs, all in the name of stopping one of the attacks in the reality he's from. He is ensuring the bigger attack happens a half-dozen more times, across all realities, in the name of stopping it from happening once in his reality.
The question is, do people in other realities have standing?
My friend Sam, a philosophy major I met here in California, suggested that another consequence of considering the moral standing of people in other realities is that it can serve to de-value the suffering in our own reality. If there are infinite realities with infinite people suffering infinitely, does one person suffering here even matter? If such de-valuation is a danger, should that be used as a point of argument for caring only about our own reality? Or should we have a "prime directive" that forbids interfering with other realities (and would essentially outlaw Source Code, since it does just that)?
Steve?
8 comments:
Alright… first off such a long post and broad philosophical topics takes a while to respond to, sorry. Everyone who has seen Source Code has the disadvantage of me, since; at least in this universe I have not seen it… and, am hopefully not completely delusional in the fact that I am indeed alive and myself. But one of the main points brought up- the devaluation of individual suffering in light of an infinite amount of it via the moral standing of persons in other realities argument.
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My full respect to Sam in California, it’s always good to hear of another going down the dark path of philosophy, but, as I can see the point, respectfully I disagree with it The point, as I understand it being, is that the suffering of individual ‘i’ ('i' can be taken to be any individual) in this reality (space/timeline) is devalued by knowledge of the fact of the multiple of worlds where a possible infinite number of ‘i’s’ are suffering equally as much. Let us strip the term suffering from the equation (a little heartless… I know). Now we can see both movements for what they are: as individuals are added, value is taken to be the summation of ‘i’s’ and not the number of ‘i’s’ adding to create said summation.
Each ‘i’ though still has the value of 1; true the ratio is changing 1:100, 1:1000, 1:1000,000 and so forth; but the intrinsic value of 1=1 never changes or gets devalued in an objective sense. For value to be additive each constituent must have some type of determinant value, like grains of sand creating a beach… the beach is the summation of all the grains of sand, but would not exist without the grains of sand. This determinant value is not changed by innumerable grains, 1 still equals 1, but when we’re talking about relaxing on the beach we’re not talking about relaxing on one grain of sand, but rather their summation- which is the beach. Likewise, we we’re talking about decisions and morality, knowledge of the larger the summation of ‘i’s’ seems like it would matter… and I think it does, but does the fact that our decisions would change due to the ratio between individual and summation make the individual any less of an individual compared to the summation? That logical point remains no- the individual is still equal to 1i even if we are talking about 1000i (never mind imaginary numbers).
[Point continued...]
How we would behave might differ, but “objective” value (if there is such a thing) ought not be derived by our behavior… having written that we could go into numerous other arguments like whether or not anything has intrinsic value or whether it is just ascribed by us; though, if this is the case, then the nice neat logic behind the summation devaluing the individual flies apart, because it could just as easily be that the individual trumps the summation because we like the individual more… very worrying. In conclusion-
My Best to you Sam of California.
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My next response is to- the ethics of time travel and reality creation, I would “kind of” agree with you Nick. I would say a type of prime directive or precedential category deriving when actions in this vein are, if ever, justified; and precisely what types of actions. Okay, let’s slow down and back up, and look at this from a more metaphysical perspective: Each time Gyllenhaal quantum leaps into another individual via the Source Code, let’s say, at that point another timeline is created. If said timeline wasn’t there before because a new variable, in this case Gyllenhaal, hadn’t been introduced invasion of the body snatchers style, than all the ‘i’s’ of the new timeline are created at the moment of the quantum leap and before then are potentially existent. Now two scenarios develop: is it okay to create a reality of people if by your actions a determinant amount of them may well be created just to die; and do potentials have moral standing.
The first scenario: the actualization of potentials to a reality, and are we responsible for said reality. The creation of said realities would be a physical consequent of how the universe/multiverse acts, as neutral as the law of gravity; but what we would be responsible for, in a roundabout way, are said reality’s initial conditions. This boils down to our behavior & response in the first “devaluing of ‘i’s’” position. Here is where, I believe things become suprarational and perhaps a little nutty… because now we are talking morality not even respective to lives and suffering. To illustrate this let’s take Gyllenhaal and quantum leap him, not in respect to terrorists and suffering, but in respect to ruining someone’s marriage, but each time he tries he ends up solidifying it even further… in this scenario is he not maximizing positive outcomes and therefore creating positive realities? To avoid this, the question becomes- is it moral to create other realities with time travel in the first place.
[Point continued...]
Now is when the second part- do potentials have moral value, comes into play. We use potentials all the time in decision making- if I potentially don’t do my assignments then I potentially could flunk out, or if I potentially ran over a rat then it would be potentially dead; and thus you would behave accordingly if you liked rats or disliked the prospect of flunking out. But when time travel and quantum leaping is thrown into the mix things get, again, a little nutty: Say we’re not talking time-travel with respect to a multiverse, that is, any changes made will unfold changing this reality and the time traveler will wink out of existence after they manipulate the time stream (let’s set universe ending paradoxes aside and say that a new iteration of the same thing is made at the point of temporal change). Let’s say I do this. My changes won’t affect me. Because the I making the change is a distinct psychological and physical entity aside from whatever the new iteration of the timeline will become. I if I didn’t cease to exist would become an artifact from the old temporal iteration that now exists in the new temporal iteration. So it’s irrational for me to do any kind of manipulation in that way. Now let’s say that I travel back in time and somehow manipulate events so someone whom I want to see fail, fails and has an unsuccessful life. Is this wrong? Instinctively we (the royal we) and I want to say yes, but all the people of the new temporal iteration are subject to the same moral responsibility for their choices aren’t they? Unless determinism is true and in that case the cat is out of the bag and even talking about it is pointless and predetermined. So the abstract temporal responsibility questions boil down to practical moral scenarios of is it wrong to manipulate events to have someone else fail, etc.
My final interest relates to if the multiple worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics can even really be manipulated to be time travel. Try reading Timeline, by Michael Crichton. The premise is the same. The flaw that I see is that this isn’t an instance of traveling temporally anymore, it becomes an instance of traveling locally within the multiverse. Any changes that result will be because of some mysterious link between distinct locations; analogous to the act of me going to Terre Haute makes untold things happen in Indianapolis. Whereas this may be true via Chaos Theory, if the locations are distinct enough it shouldn’t matter.
So local vs. temporal travel… are they two different things?
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The last point is on the multiple worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics itself. You can read arguments of this same type in The Conscious Mind in the section- Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics, by David Chalmers. The question is, if the multiple worlds interpretation of Quantum Mechanics is talking about choices creating realities or offshoots, or whether all those realities already (not potentially) exist parallel to our own accounting for every different possible choice, and when you get right down to it- particle/wave state. To me the former makes no sense, even though the latter is extremely weird and seems to take free will out of the bag as well…
If the latter is true, then we wouldn’t be talking about time travel either, rather predetermined relationships between distinct pre-existing realities.
Weird… weird, weird.
As a final note… it sucks to be that displaced or repressed consciousness…
Weird… weird, weird.
You may read my use of the terms objective as equal to absolute and subjective as equal to relative if that makes more sense in one of my posts talking about devaluation of persons via their and other multiverse individuals.
So I got halfway through writing a big long response and then must have navigated away or something because I lost it all and don't have the energy to write it again at the moment, plus I have no internets and have to wander the deserted streets searching for WiFi. More later.
Lest anyone think I am a flake, I can assure everyone that I had a very long conversation with Steve about this in another medium ;)
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